

Implementation of new market design options with large shares of Renewables

Sustainable Energy week 2016

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# **Outline**

- State of play- Changing landscape
- Making RES fit for the Market
- Making the market fit for RES
- Evolution Roadmap and conclusions





## Support scheme and obligations (from 2016)

- aid is granted as a premium in addition to the market price (premium);
- balancing responsibilities, unless no liquid intra-day markets exist;
- measures to ensure that generators have no incentive to generate electricity under negative prices."

"As technologies mature and their production reaches a substantial share of the market, renewable energy production can and should react to market signals, and aid amounts should respond to falling production costs."

Source: DG Competition

## Competitive bidding processes for setting the premium (from 2017)

- competitive bidding process (clear, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria), unless MS can demonstrate that they lead to higher prices or there is lack of competition
- It can be technology specific (opportunity to less mature technologies and diversification)
- Opportunities for all (small installations or technologies in an early stage of development can be exempted).
  - <1 MW of power from other renewable sources, such as solar or biomass.
  - <6 MW or 6 generation units for wind energy.



# Market instruments for solar PV energy in the EU

### Ireland:

- FiT
- Self consumption
- Energy sale on el. market

- -FiT
- Quota system
- Self consumption
- Energy sale on el. market
- VAT reductions
- Fiscal incentives

## The Netherlands:

- Green bonus tender scheme
- Net metering
- Energy sale on el. market
- Fiscal incentives

### Luxembourg:

- FiT
- Investment grants
- Fiscal incentives

#### Belgium:

- Green certificates
- Net metering
- Energy sale on el. market
- VAT reduction
- Fiscal incentives

#### France:

- FiT
- Tenders
- VAT reduction

## Portugal:

- FiT
- Self consumption
- Energy sale on el. market
- Fiscal incentives

#### Spain:

- Self consumption
- Energy sale on el. market

#### Austria:

- FiT
- Self consumption
- Energy sale on el. market
- Investment grants

#### Germany:

- FiT
- Storage system Beneficial credit terms Tenders
- Premium tariff Investment grants

- Energy sale on el. market

- Self consumption

Designs as of March 2015

Designs in Q4 2014

Source: SolarPower Europe

Switzerland:

Self consumption

Investment grants

Fiscal incentives

Energy sale on el. market

FiT

#### Denmark:

- FiT
- Net metering

- Investment grants
  - VAT reduction
- Self consumption Fiscal incentives

#### Sweden:

- Quota system
- Energy sale on el. market
- Investment grants
- Fiscal incentives

### Finland:

Investment grants

#### Estonia:

- Premium tariff
- Energy sale on el. market
- Investment grants

#### Latvia:

- Net metering
- Self consumption
- Energy sale on el. market
- Investment grants

## Lithuania:

FiT

Investment grants

#### Poland:

- Green certificates
- Energy sale on el. market

#### Czech Republic:

Energy sale on el. market

## Slovakia & Cyprus:

FiT

## Hungary:

- FiT
- Net metering
- Investment grants

### Romania:

- Quota system
- Net metering
- Energy sale on el. market

## Bulgaria:

- FiT

## Greece:

- FiT
- Net metering
- Fiscal incentives

## Slovenia:

-FiT

Croatia:

consumption

- FiT

Self

- Premium tariff
- Energy sale on el. market

Sales incentives

## Malta:

- FiT
- Self consumption
- Energy sale on el. market


## Italy:

- Net billing (Scambio sul Posto)
- Indirect energy sale (Ritiro Didicato)
- Energy sale on el. market
- Beneficial credit terms
- VAT reduction





# Market instruments for wind energy in the EU




# Tendering experience in the EU (Wind energy) Increasing number of countries gaining experience in tenders for RES support State Aid Guidelines Past / existing FI **Ucoming** NO SE HU RO

Source: WindEurope



## RES fit for the market & Market fit for RES

Main areas influencing the design of energy policy





# **Project Initial Assessment of RES market instruments**

## **Design Options**

- ✓ Long term clean capacity auction
- ✓ Long-term clean energy auction
  - √ Certificates
  - √ FIP (auction)

- ✓ FIP regulated
- ✓ Net metering
  - ✓ FIT
- ✓ Support conditioned to the provision of grid support

## Weak points (-)

- FIP (auction), Certificates, and energy auction create non-negligible distortion of short term prices
- Distortions created by FIP (auction), Certificates, and energy auction are not stable
- · Relevant amount of support provided
- Create some barriers to RES participation in markets
- All create relevant distortion of short term prices (FIT-largest, FIP regulatedrelevant, Net Metering-localized)
- FITs, Net Metering, and Voltage condition reduce liquidity in short term markets
- · Prone to political intervention
- · Large support for regulated FIT and FIP
- Create some barriers to RES participation in markets

## Strong points (+)

- Limited distortion of efficient short term signals (negligible for LT clean capacity auction)
- Tend to foster liquidity as revenues (partially) depend on spot market prices
- · Certificates promote Cost Causality
- · Resilient to political intervention

- FIP regulated promotes liquidity in short term markets
- Low overall support involved in Net Metering
- Grid support condition reduces the amount of support mobilized

Most promising design options (overall strong grades)


Discarded design options (overall <u>weak</u> grades)



# A balance needs to be found between market exposure and overall policy support

Impact of investment risk on PV generation cost

Capital intensive technologies are much more sensitive to financing cost (investment risk)




Notes: This example is based on output of 1 360 kWh/kW/y, investment costs of USD 1 500/W, annual operations and maintenance (O&M) of 1% of investment, project lifetime of 20 years, and residual value of 0.



# The devil is in the detail...


The specific design aspects of a concrete market instrument is as important as the type of market instrument

Distortion with short-term dispatch





## Innovating on the premium scheme



Source: CEER report on support schemes, 2016

## Premium design options

- Setting an appropriate timeframe: From hours to years
  - Hours: no market exposure, as with FIT (CfD in UK)
  - Monthly: some market exposure, high degree of certainty (DE)
  - Yearly: strong incentive to perform better than expected market outcome (NL, ES)
- Selecting an appropriate set of market prices values
  - Average market prices OR average market prices adapted to the production profile
    of the technology (DK- fix premium based on size of rotor)
- Deciding when to set the premium and for how long
  - Ex-ante vs. ex- post. Revision frequency
  - · Calendar year vs fix amount of full-load hours



# Design aspects to be considered for Tender systems

## Before

**Ensuring Certainty** and visibility for investore

- Scope of the auction (national, regional, or European);
- Technology neutral vs. specific;
- Capacity and frequency of auctions:
- Size of systems included in an auction:
- Pre-qualification criteria:
- Entry-cost

## During

## Costeffectiveness

- Price settlement (sealed-bid tender, descending clock:
- Caps
- Floors


## After

## **Ensuring project** fulfilment

- Time to deliver:
- Transparency on bids selected:
- Liabilities and penalties in case of delay or nonfulfilment:
- Secondary market and resubmission of unsuccessful bids.

# **Cost Reduction Potential of auctions systems**

- In Brazil there has been a sustained 25% drop in prices from the first year of onshore wind auctions.
- It is however unclear whether further cost reduction will be triggered (or at which rate). Prices might go up over time.



Source: BNEF

Impacts of auctions in the year that follows introduction:


- 15% to 50% reduction
- 35% average reduction






## RES fit for the market & Market fit for RES


Main areas influencing the design of energy policy



# Market fit for RES at all timeframes




## Market fit for RES at all timeframes




# Example: The advantages of smaller products (dayahead and intraday)

Comparison of potential 15-min schedules vs. hourly schedules of solar production in Germany on 21 June 2014



Source: ACER 2014 Market Monitoring Report

# Example: The advantages of smaller products (balancing)



Provision of downward regulation by wind farms is more effective than by conventional generators





# Looking ahead- Regulatory implications

## **RES** market instruments


- State-aid guidelines review: process starts on 2017 (post-2020)
  - Continuation of the existing principles (gain market experience)
  - Technology specific instruments
  - Market based-tenders
  - Market based- Premium (floating, fix): focus on revenue stabilization

# Market integration and the target Model

- Implementation of market network codes (Balancing, Capacity allocation and congestion management)- Full implementation after 2020
  - Flow base capacity allocation, recalculation in the intraday timeframe
  - Integrated balancing regions, open to all market parties



# Support schemes and overall market aspects should evolve in parallel



FIT needed in early technology introduction when market conditions not suitable

Market prices have strong impact on dependence of specific market instruments

<sup>\*</sup>Explicit support is needed when other complementary markets do not function correctly and when environmental externalities are not internalized.

# **Conclusions**

- Adaptation of RES market instruments needs to be done in parallel to the adaptation of the electricity market (implementation of the target model)
- Exposure to market needs to be balanced with investment risk as this will have direct impact on total policy support
- Tenders need careful design as there are many potential counter-productive results (overtime increasing cost, exclusion of small players, technology neutrality)





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Thank you very much for your attention





# BACKUP





# Looking ahead- Regulatory implications

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## Focus on Intra day Market Gate Closure time -Harmonization toward 60': close real time need to reduce it to align with (5' in BE/NL) national GCT - Cross-border capacity implicit allocation 1. Faster 2. Larger markets markets (cross-border (shorter lead times) participation) Hybrid system 4. Efficient 3. Smaller products pricing Continuous trading + 15' discrete auctions Allow aggregation 5. Level Playing field for all market players

