



Low-carbon technologies, risks and support options

Market4RES WP5

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May 19th, 2016



Co-funded by the Intelligent Energy Europe
Programme of the European Union

Support mechanisms: risks v. incentives





Support schemes: how do they help?



Investment support make projects more attractive by **reducing their costs**. Subsidy /MW upfront: only part of the cost remain at the expense of the producer. Financial guarantee: access to cheaper capital



Operating aid (/MWh) make projects more attractive **by increasing their expected revenues and** often also by **making future revenues more certain**, therefore granting access to cheaper capital.





What makes an efficient support mechanism?

Integration into the power system

- Electricity from RES is welcomed in the power system at the lowest possible cost. RES producers can value their flexibility (balancing, voltage control...)

Financial risk for producers

- The uncertainty on projects' future revenues is limited so as to enable high "gearing", i.e. access to relatively cheap capital.


Short-term distortions

- Short-term merit order is not altered by RES generation. Producers able to generate when the price is high are rewarded.


Long-term distortions

- Private investment decisions leads to the best collective choices (no investment bias due to the subsidy)

Arbitrage between risk and incentives









Arbitrage between risk and incentives



→ Here we focus on the **risk** part: the value of incentives is not explored ←



Market risks in RES projects, according to the nature of the support scheme



Volume risk and price risk

Volume risk and profile risk



Volume risk alone

No risk

Modelling investment in power generation





Short-term modelling of power systems based on optimization programmes

Short-term module: optimal dispatch

Principle:

Min variable cost


Under constraints of P=C, max generation, interconnections

Inputs:

- Generation mix
- Network model
- Demand, availability of generation units

Assumption:

Perfect competition in the short term
(market outcome is optimal)



Variable

$$\text{Variable cost} = \sum_{p \in \text{Plants}, t} VC_p \cdot Gen_{p,t}$$

$$\forall p, \forall t, 0 \leq Gen_{p,t} \leq GenCap_p$$

VC_p is the cost of primary energy + cost of CO₂ if applicable



Optimal investment in power systems based on a short-term dispatch module

Short-term module: optimal dispatch

Principle:

Min variable cost


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$$\forall p, \forall t, 0 \leq Gen_{p,t} \leq GenCap_p$$

Generation mix

Long-term module: optimal investment

Min total cost (variable + fixed)

Under mix technical (potential) and political mix constraints

Various investment decision techniques





Optimal investment in power systems as integrated optimization programme

Co-optimization of investment and dispatch

Principle:

Min total cost (= variable + fixed)

Under constraints of P=C, max generation, interconnections, mix constraints

Inputs:

- Mix constraints
- Network model
- Demand, availability of generation units

Assumption:

Perfect competition over the short and long terms

Variable Parameter

$$\text{Total cost} = \sum_{p \in \text{plants}} FC_p \cdot GenCap_p + \sum_{p \in \text{Plants}, t} VC_p \cdot Gen_{p,t}$$

$$\forall p, \forall t, 0 \leq Gen_{p,t} \leq GenCap_p$$

Additional mix constraints, e.g.:

$$GenCap_{RES} \geq X \text{ GW} \quad \text{Min RES generation capacity}$$

$$\sum_{p \in \text{RES plants}, t} Gen_{p,t} \geq Y \text{ TWh} \quad \text{Min RES generation}$$

$$\sum_{p \in \text{Plants}, t} EF_p \cdot Gen_{p,t} \leq Z \text{ MtCO}_2 \quad \text{CO2 emissions cap}$$





Taking risk into account in long-terms models of the power system

Numerator / certainty equivalent method

$$NPV = -I + \sum_{t=1}^{lifetime} \frac{Certainty\ equiv.\ of\ income\ distribution}{(1 + \tau_f)^t}$$

Denominator / beta method

$$NPV = -I + \sum_{t=1}^{lifetime} \frac{E[income(t)]}{(1 + \tau_f + \beta\phi)^t}$$

→ Under normal hypotheses on the distribution of incomes, the two methods are equivalent

In practice : static optimization based on an annualized vision of costs


$$\text{Annual capital cost} = \frac{\tau * I}{1 - (1 + \tau)^{-lifetime}}$$

$$WACC : \tau = \tau_f + \beta\phi$$




$$\text{Annual fixed cost} = \text{Annual capital cost} + \text{annual O&M cost}$$

Reduction of the optimisation problem size


Monte-Carlo simulation and / or difficult constraints
→ infeasible problem due to its size



Random selection of thousands of subsets



Reduction of the optimisation problem size



Result: approximate load-duration curve plotted against actual
($y=x$ means ideal fit)

Exploring decarbonization options





Modelling assumptions – data sources

Consumption, RES profiles and NTCs

ENTSO-E TYNDP

historical time series 2000-2011
adjusted to 2030 in Vision 4
scenario + projected NTCs

Other availability profiles, hydro stocks

Generated with ANTARES (RTE's main tool for adequacy studies)
based on a "New mix 2030" situation

Variable costs

IEA / ENTSO-E Fuel prices
projections to 2030

ADEME, RTE ECO2Mix CO2
emissions from primary energies

Fixed costs (excluding discount rates)

IEA Projected costs of generating
electricity

ADEME 100 % ENR, benchmark from
many sources



Taking risk into account

WACC hypotheses used in this study

WP5 'reference'
and 'high' scenario
hypotheses

Conventional technologies: **8 %**

RES technologies, computed based on conclusions from the Beyond 2020 European project

- **8 %** if all revenues come from the market (including ETS)
- **FIT: 6,2 %**

Beyond2020
unmodified
hypotheses

Conventional technologies: **9,8 %**

- **9,8 %** if all revenues come from the market (including ETS)
- **FIT: 7,5 %**

For sensibility analysis:
“optimistic” hypotheses

Conventional technologies: **10 %**

- **10 %** if all revenues come from the market (including ETS)
- **FIT: 5 %**

Modelling assumptions: mix constraints


- Atom = 40 GW
- Cart = No lignite
- Waterfall = 8 GW (dams)

Lignite
Hard coal

CCGT
OCGT

RoR
Dams

Wind
Solar



These countries will also be taken into account in the final version




Methodology

Reference


WP5 High RES scenario:
95 €/tCO₂ + RES capacities
~ 250 MtCO₂ (= 150 g/kWh)

- Cheapest mix to reach 250 MtCO₂ ?

Support scheme options



Market + CO₂ price
from
Cap & Trade



Floating FIP or FIT

Market design variants


- CO₂ price from cap & trade (ETS) and no RES target


- RES targets and support, no CO₂ price

- RES targets and support + CO₂ cost from a tax or a price floor on the ETS


- Different CO₂ cost levels
- National targets, technology-specific v. regional targets, technology-neutral

Results: Support scheme v. emissions cap & trade






Results: Carbon price + Regional, technology neutral target and support




Results:

Carbon price + Regional, technology neutral target and support




Results:

Carbon price + National, technology specific targets and support



Results:


Comparison of unit cost of electricity



Unit cost of electricity as a function of the support mechanism's design

Results:

Comparison of unit cost of electricity



Results:

Comparison of unit cost of electricity



Unit cost of electricity as a function of the support mechanism's design,
compared with the unit cost in the case of quotas



Conclusions



CO₂ pricing through a global cap is a more efficient tool to reach emissions targets than direct support to RES (or low carbon technologies in general)



Without carbon pricing, cheap decarbonisation (switch from coal to gas) options **remain untapped**.

Without support scheme, capital-intensive low-carbon technologies **remain very expensive**.



Combining **a moderate but certain CO2 price** and an **explicit support scheme** allows to benefit from both cheap decarbonisation options low-carbon technologies at a reasonable cost





Homework to go further

- • Include **missing countries** (Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal)
 - • Improving the **hypotheses on capital cost** as a function of
 - • the design of the support mechanism
 - • the domestic context of each country
 - • Test the robustness of the conclusion to **alternative long-term scenarios** (two other long-term scenarios described in WP5 will be assessed)
 - • What does it change if we consider the **socio-economic value** How to compute it: socioeconomic beta of low-carbon projects?
- 



Coordinated by



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Contact: Market4RES@sintef.no

Results, event calendar and all related news can be found on www.market4RES.eu





Co-funded by the Intelligent Energy Europe
Programme of the European Union

**Thank you very much
for your attention**



Modelling assumptions: mix constraints (complete set of countries)

No nuclear

No lignite

= 1 GW (dams)

5000 MW

2400 MW

1000 MW

= 0,4 GW

No lignite

No dam

= 40 GW

No lignite

= 8 GW (dams)

4300 /
2800 MW

4100 MW


No nuclear

No lignite

= 8,2 GW (dams)

No nuclear

= 0,9 GW (dams)



= 7 GW

No lignite

= 5,5 GW (dams)